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COMPLIANCE WITHOUT REMANDS: The 
Experience Under the European Convention 
on Human Rights 
 
John Cary Simst 
 
 
Those familiar with practices followed in the federal and state courts 
within the United States are well aware of the central role played by 
"remands" from appellate courts in achieving compliance with their 
judgments.  In the run-of-the-mill case, the reviewing court does not direct 
the disposition of the matter, but rather remands the case to a lower court 
for further handling in accordance with whatever guidance is to be found in 
the appellate ruling. 
The topic that this article will address sits well outside the familiar 
world of remands.  Without, I hope, imposing any inappropriate diversion 
on those participating in this symposium with the intention of deliberating 
on the remand process, I intend to acquaint the participants with an 
alternative judicial universe in which remands are not utilized-in which, in 
fact, remands are not even possible. Examination of this distinctive arena in 
which appellate judgments are enforced without remands, and identification 
of the strengths and weaknesses of such an approach, may help us to 
understand our own system more thoroughly and plan reforms more 
confidently. 
My attention will be focused on the judgments of the European Court of 
Human Rights (sometimes referred to here as the "European Court" or the 
ECHR).1    This court, the judicial arm of the Council of Europe, is 
responsible for interpreting the European Convention on Human Rights (the 
"Convention"),2  and it rendered 844 judgments in the year 2002,3  many 
 
t Professor of Law, University of the Pacific/McGeorge School of Law. 
1. For  a  history  of  the  European  Court  of  Human Rights  see  REGISTRAR  OF  THE 
EUROPEAN   COURT   OF   HUMAN    RIGHTS,    INFORMATION   DOCUMENT,    at   http://www.echr. 
coe.int!Eng/EDocs/HistoricalBackground.htm (Sept. 2003). 
2. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened 
for signature Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (modified Nov. 1, 1998) [hereinafter European 
Convention on Human Rights], available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en 
/Treaties/Html/005.htm (last visited March 22, 2004).   The Convention entered into force on 
September 3, 1953, and was extensively modified by Protocol 11, effective November 1, 1998. 
Unless otherwise specified, the Article numbers used here are those of the current convention 
text, although some Articles were previously identified by a different number. 
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times the number of judgments handed down by the Supreme Court of the 
United States.4   However, unlike the Supreme Court, which can and usually 
does remand cases to the federal and state courts whose judgments have 
been reviewed, the ECHR is a supranational tribunal that is entirely without 
power to remand a case to a national court. 
What makes the enforcement process for ECHR judgments so 
interesting is that the court announces nearly one thousand judgments a 
year, often in high-profile cases on which emotions run high, yet it has no 
remand  mechanism  at  its  command.    Nonetheless, there  is  a  broad 
consensus that the level of compliance with ECHR judgments is very high, 
even if compliance is not always cheerfully and quietly carried out by the 
affected   states.      The   achievement  of   such   remarkable   success  in 
enforcement, without resort to the method traditionally relied upon in the 
United States, commands our attention and analysis. 
 
 
THE ECHR AND ITS MILIEU 
 
The European Court of Human Rights is provided for in Article 19 of 
the Convention.5   It is an organ of the Council of Europe, which comprises 
forty-five nations within Europe, with a population of over 800 million.6 
The Council of Europe has a much more extensive membership than. the 
European Union, which presently has fifteen members, with ten additional 
members entering in 2004.7   Not surprising in light of the large number of 
member states, the Council of Europe includes states with quite diverse 
political processes, economic circumstances, social structures, languages, 
religious traditions, and legal systems. 
The number of judges on the ECHR is equal to the number of High 
Contracting Parties, that is, the states that have ratified the Convention.8 
Each High Contracting Party nominates three candidates to serve "with 
respect to" it, and the ParliamentarY Assembly of the Council of Europe 
 
3. See SUBJECT-MATTER OF JUDGMENTS DELIVERED BY THE COURT IN 2002 63, at http:/I 
www.echr.coe.intJEng!EDocs/subjectmatter2002table.pdf (last visited March 22, 2004). 
4.      The Supreme Court, 2002 Term: The Statistics, 117 HARV. L. REv. 480, 487 (2003) (in 
the 2002 Term, ninety-two cases were disposed of on review and fifty-three others were decided 
summarily). 
5. European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 2, at article 19. 
6. See,  e.g.,  Council  of  Europe,  available  at  http://www.coe.int/DefaultEN.asp  (last 
visited March 
7.     For example, Russia, Turkey, and Switzerland are each members of the Council of 
Europe, but will not be members of the European Union even after the 2004 expansion.  See 
Council of Europe, supra note 6. 
8. There are currently forty-four judgeships, one of which is vacant. See European Court 
of Human Rights, supra note 1. 
36:0639] COMPLIANCE WITHOUT REMANDS 641  
then elects a judge off the list by majority vote.9  There is no formal limit on 
the number of judges who may be elected from a given state, but under this 
system each High Contracting Party generally nominates its own citizens, 
with the fmal composition of the court naturally tending to be one in which 
each High Contracting Party sees one of its nationals sitting as a judge. 10 
Although nationality figures prominently in the election process, the judges 
serve in their individual capacity, not as governmental representatives.n 
The court sits in Strasbourg, France. 12 
Although the jurisdiction of the ECHR originally extended only to 
complaints lodged by one High Contracting Party against another, 
complaints   filed   by   individuals   and   organizations   against   a   High 
Contracting Party  have long constituted the  main  work  of  the  court. 13 
Especially in light of the fact that almost any judgment determining that a 
High Contracting Party has violated the Convention involves just one of the 
state's  own nationals, it is easy to see why issues of compliance abound. 
No government finds it pleasant to be declared to be in violation of its legal 
obligations, even by its own courts, and it is not unusual for the affected 
state  to  manifest certain distaste for  the  outcome, and  perhaps even  a 
reluctance to carry out a court's decision. Whatever may be the obstacles to 
compliance within a given state, however, the rendition of an unfavorable 
judgment by a supranational court is much more likely to be controversial 
and to trigger resistance to compliance, at least among some elements of the 
state's political leadership. 
Because of  the  natural and  quite  predictable (if  somewhat uneven) 
reluctance  of  states  to  comply  fully  and  promptly  with  some  adverse 
decisions coming from Strasbourg, the Convention itself sets out the 
obligation to comply, and establishes a mechanism for bringing about 
compliance. Article 46 states: 
 
1.  The High Contracting Parties undertake to abide by the final 
judgment of the Court in any case to which they are parties. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9. !d. 
10.   The rare exceptions are where a very small state nominates a candidate from outside 
its borders.   Thus, Judge Lucius Caflisch, who is Swiss, was elected by Liechtenstein.  See 
European Court of Human Rights, supra note 1. 
11.   See European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 2, at article 21(2). 
12.   See European Court of Human Rights, available at http://www.echr.coe.int (last 
visited March 22, 2004). 
13.   See European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 2, at article 34. See also id. at 
article 33. 
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2.   The final judgment of the Court shall be transmitted to the 
Committee of Ministers, which shall supervise its execution.14 
 
The  Committee  of  Ministers  (the  "Committee")   is  made  up  of  the 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Member States of the Council of Europe, 
although  the  functions  of  the  Committee  with  respect  to  human  rights 
judgments are normally carried out by the deputies of the ministers, acting 
as the Committee.15   The Committee meets six times a year to carry out its 
duties under the Convention, and the deliberations take place behind closed 
doors, although the agendas for the meetings are now made public, as are 
the actions taken. 16    The procedures followed by the Committee regarding 
its supervision of the execution of ECHR judgments are set out in rules that 
were adopted on January 10, 2001.17 
The judgments of the ECHR are transmitted to the Committee pursuant 
to  Article  46  of  the  Convention,  and  the  case  is  then  placed  on  the 
Committee's agenda "without delay."18  Where there has been a violation of 
the Convention, "the Committee shall invite the State concerned to inform it 
of the measures which the State has taken in consequence of the judgment, 
having regard to its obligation to abide by it under Article 46, paragraph 1, 
of the Convention."19 
While neither a detailed knowledge of the substantive  rights protected 
by the Convention nor an intimate familiarity with the case law developed 
by the ECHR is necessary for the discussion of enforcement which follows, 
there is a need to perceive the range of remedies available under the 
Convention.  Article 41 of the Convention provides: 
 
If the court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention 
or  the  protocols thereto, and  if  the  internal  law  of  the  High 
 
 
14.   !d. 
15.   Prior to the far-reaching revisions of the Convention that took effect on November 1, 
1998, the Committee of Ministers decided some cases arising under the Convention, but it no 
longer has that authority.  P. VAN DIJK  & G.J.H. VAN HOOF,  THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE 
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 267-68 (3d ed. 1998). 
16.   A very useful description of the operation of the Committee is to be found in CLARE 
OVEY & ROBIN WHITE,  THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS,  420-36 (3d ed. 2002) 
[hereinafter OVEY & WHITE]. For a succinct and informative summary, see a monograph 
published by the Council of Europe.  ELISABETH LAMBERT-ABDELGAWAD, THE EXECUTION OF 
JUDGMENTS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2002) [hereinafter LAMBERT- 
ABDELGAWAD].  My description of the functions of and procedures followed by the Committee 
of Ministers draws on both of these sources. 
17.   Rules  adopted  by the  Committee of  Ministers for  the  application of  article  46, 
paragraph 2, of the European Convention on Human Rights, available at http://cm.coe.int/ 
intro/e-rules46.htm [hereinafter Committee ofMinisters]. 
18.   !d. at Rule 2. 
19.   !d. at Rule 3a. 
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Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be 
made, the court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the 
injured party.20 
The recent case Lustig-Prean v.  United Kingdom21 provides an 
illustration of the ECHR's  approach in calculating just satisfaction.   The 
applicants were two former members of the British armed forces who had 
been discharged because of their homosexuality?2     The ECHR found a 
violation of Article 8 of the Convention, which guarantees a right to respect 
for one's  private life?3     Just satisfaction, in this context, was found to 
encompass: (1)  non-pecuniary loss, such  as  psychological damage; (2) 
pecuniary loss resulting from the disruption of the applicants' careers, 
including past loss of earnings, future loss of earnings, and loss of pension 
benefits; (3) costs and expenses of the litigation; and (4) interest, payable 
beginning three months after entry of the award.  What is most pertinent to 
this discussion is that "just  satisfaction" represents a direction to pay a 
certain amount of money, and thus "it is an obligation capable of direct and 
clear performance."24    The only enforcement issue- that is likely to arise as 
to such relief is whether the payment ordered has in fact been made by the 
state responsible for the violation. 
"Just satisfaction is the only measure that the European Court can order 
a state responsible for a violation of the Convention to take."25    As will be 
described  more  completely  in  the  discussion  below,  however,  final 
resolution of a case before the court in which a violation has been found 
often  depends  upon  the   state's   implementation  of   both  "individual 
measures" and "general measures" designed to put the injured party in the 
same  position  as  enjoyed  prior  to  the  violation,  and  to  prevent  new 
violations of a similar nature.  Individual measures can take many forms, 
such as reopening domestic legal proceedings; vacating a judgment or 
preventing  it  from  being  enforced;  modification  of  police  records  to 
expunge a conviction; or issuing an entry or residence permit to a non- 
citizen.   General measures may assume even a greater variety of forms, 
including most prominently: amending the offending Constitutional 
provision, statute, or rule; changing administrative practices; altering case 
 
 
 
20.    European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 2. 
21.    29 Eur. Ct. H.R. 548, 548 (2000), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/hudocNiew 
Root.asp?Item=1&Action=Html&X=327235130&Notice=O&Noticemode=&RelatedMode=O 
(last visited March 22, 2004). 
22.    Id. 2. 
23.   Id. 62-105. 
24.    LAMBERT-ABDELGAWAD, supra note 16, at 13. 
25.   Id. 
644 ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL [Ariz. St. L.J.  
 
law to conform to the principles announced by the ECHR; publicizing the 
court's ruling or issuing a circular letter alerting relevant officials to the law 
declared by the court; or executive action to conform to the newly- 
announced  principles,  or  a  declaration  or  solemn  undertaking  by  the 
officials concerned of what actions they will take in the future to assure 
compliance. 
Once the court's  judgment has been transmitted to the Committee of 
Ministers, the role of the ECHR is at an end?6     As described above, the 
Committee promptly puts the matter on its human rights agenda, and 
continues to revisit the case at regular intervals, both to determine whether 
the award for just satisfaction has been paid, and to decide whether 
appropriate individual and reneral measures have been taken.   Interim 
resolutions may be adopted,2   and this is particularly likely to occur when a 
·  case languishes for long periods without the state involved taking actions 
which  are  considered  to  constitute  full  compliance  with  the  court's 
judgment. Ultimately, when the Committee determines that full compliance 
has been achieved, it adopts a formulaic resolution reciting the history of 
the case and stating that the Committee "has exercised its functions under 
Article 46, paragraph 2, of the Convention in this case." 28 
 
 
 
THE UNCONVENTIONAL NATURE OF THE CONVENTION'S  ENFORCEMENT 
PROCESS 
Judged from an American perspective, the process described above is 
decidedly irregular.  For example, when the Supreme Court of the United 
States decides a case, it has the power to remand the case to the federal or 
state court from which it came.   The Supreme Court can make its 
instructions to the lower court as specific as necessary to assure that the 
correct path is followed on remand, but the Court usually feels no need to 
be heavy-handed, perhaps because its power to control future proceedings is 
so apparent. Hart and Wechsler offer this crisp summary: 
 
Normally the Supreme Court, when reversing a state court 
judgment, remands the  case for  proceedings "not  inconsistent" 
with the Court's  opinion.  The state court is thus free to resolve 
 
 
26.    Sometimes the European Court issues an opinion finding a violation but reserves the 
remedial  issues  for  further  consideration.    In  such  cases, it  is  only  the  second  decision 
addressing remedy that is subject to supervision by the Committee of Ministers as to its 
execution, since the first opinion does not constitute the "final judgment" necessary to trigger 
the enforcement process under article 46. 
27.    Committee of Ministers, supra note 17, at Rule 7. 
28.   See Committee of Ministers, supra note 17, at Rule 8. 
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any undecided questions or even alter its determination of 
underlying state law.  The reversal may not, therefore, be decisive 
ofthe fmaljudgment.29 
 
If the prevailing  party before the Supreme  Court  considers  the lower 
court's  response  to  the  remand  to  be  unfaithful  to  the  Supreme  Court's 
decision,  a  new  petition  for  review  provides  a  ready  mechanism   for 
obtaining full compliance.   The key element of this enforcement  system is 
that the Supreme  Court  itself can decide how to structure  the remand to 
achieve  its purpose  and can even decide to forgo a remand which is not 
likely to be effective.  Thus, in Martin v. Hunter's  Lessee,30  the first round 
of litigation produced a remand with instructions to the Virginia Court of 
Appeals that judgment be entered in accordance with the original ruling of 
the trial court.31    The Court of Appeals declined to do so, however, taking 
the view that the matter was not one which could, under Article III of the 
Constitution, properly be heard at all by the Supreme Court of the United 
States.  The second  time  around,  the Supreme  Court  acted  forcefully  to 
implement  its    decision    without    further    involvement,    or    possible 
interference,  by the Virginia  Court of Appeals:   "It  is the opinion  of the 
whole court, that the judgment of the court of appeals of Virginia, rendered 
on the mandate in this cause, be reversed, and the judgment of the district 
court, held at Winchester, be, and the same is hereby affrrmed."32 
Compare to this commanding position occupied by the Supreme Court 
of  the  United  States,  that  of  the  ECHR.     The  review  conducted   in 
Strasbourg, in which an international tribunal reviews allegations that the 
matters considered by national courts have been disposed  of in a manner 
that conflicts with the European Convention, is not part of the work of the 
national court systems from which the cases arise.  There is no mechanism 
for  remand  from  the ECHR  to  any  national  court.33      The  ECHR  is not 
empowered to give any direction at all to the national courts. 
Even more intriguingly,  the ECHR cannot even order a state that has 
been held to have violated the Convention to take any action other than the 
payment   of  just  satisfaction   as  determined  by  the  court.34       There  is 
absolutely  no  authority  for  the  court  to  enjoin  a  state  from  taking  any 
 
 
 
29.   RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., ET. AL., HART AND  WECHSLER'S  THE FEDERAL COURTS AND 
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 481 (5th ed. 2003). Federal courts would be at least as likely to give full 
effect to a ruling by the Supreme Court, and perhaps even more so. 
30. 14 u.s. 304, 323 (1816). 
31.   Id. at 323-24. 
32.   Jd. at 362. 
33.   Article 46 provides the only enforcement mechanism under the Convention. 
34.   See text accompanying notes 60-84. 
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particular action (such as continuing to enforce a Constitutional provision or 
statute that has been held by the court to violate the Convention) or to order 
it to take any particular acts to undo the harm caused by the violation or to 
bring itself into compliance for the future.  Even the one tangible obligation 
that the court can impose-payment of just satisfaction-is entirely out of 
its hands as to execution.  The court has no means to itself bring about the 
attachment of assets or the use of other means of execution  of judgment, 
much less the contempt power that American courts have available to bring 
about compliance with their orders. 
The real-world  issues  presented  by efforts  to bring  about compliance 
with decisions of the ECHR will be developed below.   However, as a 
foundation for that discussion it is critical to understand that the court is 
entirely without power to enforce its decisions itself.   If enforcement is to 
be achieved, it must be rendered by the states involved,  brought about by 
the Committee  of Ministers, or achieved through  some other mechanism. 
The  standard  approach  used  by American  courts-remands to  the  lower 
courts with instructions to act consistently with the opinion, backed up by 
the prospect of further review or even use of the contempt power-is not 
available. 
Plainly, there have been cases, sometimes even entire classes of cases, 
in  which   even   with  remands   and   close   supervision   of   enforcement 
American appellate courts have found it difficult to get their decisions 
followed.   The Supreme Court and the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Fifth Circuit certainly faced great challenges in achieving integration of 
the public schools following Brown v. Board of Education.35   Those cases, 
however,  stand  out  as  relatively  rare  exceptions  to  a  general  pattern  of 
compliance.  The question to which this paper now turns is whether, lacking 
the remand  power or any other tool of direct enforcement,  the European 
court has been successful in garnering respect for and compliance with its 
judgments. 
 
 
COMPLIANCE BY STATES FOUND To HAVE VIOLATED THE EUROPEAN 
CONVENTION 
Imagine for a moment that some international tribunal (for instance, the 
International Court of Justice, or some similar body whose jurisdiction the 
United States  had  accepted)  ruled that  the "don't ask, don't  tell"  policy 
 
 
35.    347 U.S. 483 (1954). For an engaging description of the arduous process by which the 
Brown principle was implemented, see JACK BASS,  UNLIKELY HEROES:  THE DRAMATIC STORY 
OF THE SOUTHERN JUDGES WHO TRANSLATED THE SUPREME COURT'S BROWN DECISION INTO A 
REVOLUTION FOR EQUALITY (1981). 
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being implemented by the United States military violated the international 
obligations of the United States and therefore needed to be abolished. 
Judging by the political furor that gave rise to the policy in the first place, in 
which President Clinton's campaign promise to end the exclusion of gays 
from the United States military was swamped by a wave of congressional, 
military, and public opposition, it is easy to contemplate the harsh 
denunciations that would be issued.   It would be extremely likely that 
United States compliance with the international court's decision would be 
frustrated, perhaps indefinitely, by withdrawal from the treaty commitment 
on which the ruling was based, a statutory enactment prohibiting any 
alteration of United States policy to bring about compliance with the ruling, 
or perhaps even serious consideration of a Constitutional amendment. 
The hypothetical scenario set out above is, of course, not really 
hypothetical as applied to the United Kingdom.  Britain had excluded gays 
from its armed forces, and yet in the Lustig-Prean36  case described above 
and in Smith v. United Kingdom,37  also decided on September 27, 1999, the 
ECHR determined that the exclusion violated the Convention.   The 
response?    The  United  Kingdom  Ministry  of  Defence  abandoned  its 
exclusionary policy, and gays were allowed to serve, effective January 12, 
2000.38 
While  the  United  Kingdom's  compliance  with  the  ECHR's 
interpretation of the Convention as applied to the treatment of homosexuals 
was a dramatic event, that illustration of the effective enforcement of ECHR 
judgments is by no means anomalous.  For example, Professors Helfer and 
Slaughter, declared that "[S]upranational adjudication in Europe is a 
remarkable and surprising success," and recognized that the "rate of 
compliance by states with the ECHR's rulings is extremely high" in a 
comprehensive law review article addressing the "central question" of 
whether the success of supranational adjudication in Europe can be 
transplanted to other regions of the globe.39    Professor Kay has observed 
that the states found to have violated the Convention routinely "both pay the 
 
 
 
 
 
 
36.   See supra note 21. 
37.    29 Eur. Ct. H.R. 493 (2000), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/hudocNiewRoot. 
asp?Item=1&Action=Html&x=326193754&Notice=O&Noticemode=&RelatedMode=O (last 
visited March 22, 2004). 
38.    Sarah Lyall, British, Under European Ruling, End Ban on Openly Gay Soldiers, N.Y. 
TIMEs, Jan. 13, 2000, at Al. 
39.    Laurence  R.  Helfer  &  Anne-Marie  Slaughter,  Toward  a  Theory  of  Effective 
Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 276, 296 (1997). 
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compensation   ordered   by  the   Court  and   also   adjust  their   laws   and 
governmental practices to conform to the Court's interpretations."40 
Some sense of the sweeping changes that have been accepted by states 
in  order  to  respect  and  implement  the  judgments  of  the  ECHR  can  be 
obtained by reviewing the compilation available at the court's website:41 
 
[Ireland:] The Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act 1993, which 
entered into force on 7 July 1993, decriminalised homosexual acts 
conducted in private between consenting male adults of or over the 
age of 17.42 
 
[Spain:] In a judgment of 16 December 1991 the Constitutional 
Court ordered the reopening of criminal proceedings against the 
applicants. They were later acquitted.43 
 
[Italy:] The new Code of Criminal Procedure, which entered into 
force on 24 October 1989, stipulated that an indictment should be 
drafted in the language of the accused if it does not appear from 
the file that the accused knows Italian.44 
 
[United Kingdom:] The system for the administration of legal aid 
was reformed by the Legal Aid (Scotland) Act 1986 which came 
into effect on 1 April1987.45 
 
[Norway:] On 16 January 1991 the Norwegian authorities 
distributed a circular letter to all courts describing the implications 
of the Court's judgment. It was stressed that measures should be 
taken to ensure that decisions in cases of  preventive detention 
were taken "speedily.'.46 
 
[Austria:] In  a  judgment of 18  May 1993 the Supreme Court 
changed the case-law of the Austrian courts regarding the 
interpretation of Article 111 of the Criminal Code (defamation) in 
order to comply with the requirements of the Convention.47 
 
[Denmark:] In a decision of 28 October 1994 the Supreme Court 
referred to the judgment of the European Court in acquitting a 
 
 
 
40.    Richard  S. Kay, The European Convention on Human Rights and the Authority of 
Law, 8 CoNN. J. INT'L L. 217, 218 (1993) (footnote omitted). 
41.    The following examples, identified by item number, are drawn from a list of more than 
300 cases that appear on the court's  website, available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Eng!EDocs/ 
EffectsOfJudgments.html (last visited March 22, 2004). 
42.    !d. at item number 64. 
43.    !d. at item number 67. 
44.    !d. at item number 79. 
45.    !d. at item number 82. 
46.    !d. at item number 91. 
47.    !d. at item number 121. 
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journalist who was charged with invasion of privacy in relation to 
a minister.   This judgment is one of a number in which the 
Supreme Court and the Appeal Courts applied the jurisprudence of 
the European Court.48 
 
As will be discussed below, compliance with judgments of the ECHR is 
not always prompt and complete.  There have been, and remain, cases and 
even large groups of cases where efforts at execution of the judgments have 
been met with delay or even obdurate resistance. However, what is striking, 
especially in light of the court's lack of enforcement power and its inability 
to remand cases for further action, is the generally high level of compliance 
that has been demonstrated.  On the surface, the institutional structures 
available under the Convention do little to generate confidence that full 
implementation of judgments will be the norm, yet actual compliance has 
consistently been achieved at a very high level.  That experience prompts 
further inquiry into why the ECHR's interpretations of the Convention are 
enforced so much more successfully than one might predict based on an 
examination of the organizational structures alone. 
 
 
 
ENFORCEMENT WITHOUT REMANDS 
 
Some of the judgments of the ECHR, even if highly controversial, can 
be enforced without difficulty simply because compliance does not require 
much of the state involved.   While payment of the fixed sum set by the 
ECHR as just satisfaction may on occasion stimulate controversy, that 
usually does not occur.  Even a state that vigorously objects to the court's 
holding may pay the amount owing and end, once and for all, that stage of 
the controversy. 
For example, few actions taken by the ECHR have ever outraged the 
British to the degree that the September 27, 1995 judgment in the McCann 
v. United Kingdom case did.49    Three IRA terrorists were shot dead in 
Gibraltar on March 6, 1988 by members of the United Kingdom's Special 
Air Service (SAS).50   The  British government took the position that the 
shootings were justified, being attributable to the soldiers' efforts to prevent 
the terrorists from pushing a button that would detonate a large bomb.51 
The representatives of the estates of the three individuals who were killed 
 
 
48.   Id. at item number 228. 
49.   21 Eur. Ct. H.R. 97 (1996), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.intfhudocNiewRoot. 
asp?Item=O&Action=Html&X=326192922&Notice=O&Noticemode=&RelatedMode=O (last 
visited March 22, 2004). 
50.   Id. 59-67, 77-81. 
51.   !d. 132. 
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alleged that the killings were in effect nothing but extrajudicial 
executions.52    A closely-divided ECHR voted 10-9 that there had been a 
violation of Article 2 (paragraph 2a) of the Convention, with the majority 
holding that "the Court is not persuaded that the killing of the three 
terrorists constituted the use of force which was no more than absolutely 
necessary in defence of persons from unlawful violence ...."53 
Many in Britain reacted to the court's decision with fury.  For example, 
in the House of Commons, Chairman Sir Ivan Lawrence of the Home 
Affairs Select Committee attacked the ECHR in these terms:  "The British 
people are getting fed up with being told what to do by this interfering 
foreign court which does not appear to know or care about British culture 
and tradition."54   Home Secretary Michael Howard of the then-Tory cabinet 
responded that he had considerable sympathy with the view expressed.55  It 
had earlier been reported that Prime Minister John Major had hinted that the 
Gibraltar case and other setbacks suffered by the United Kingdom before 
6 the European Court might cause it to withdraw from the Convention.5 The 
government also "launched a diplomatic offensive across Europe aimed at 
garnering support to curb the powers" of the court.57 
For all the controversy surrounding· the McCann58   case, it led to no 
enforcement problem at all.  The court declined to award any damages in 
the case, and the United Kingdom promptly paid the £38,700 owing for 
costs and expenses (less the amount previously advanced by the Council of 
Europe for legal aid).59  The fact that there were many in Britain who found 
the  court's  ruling  that  there  had  been  a  violation  of  the  Convention 
offensive was essentially beside the point, since the relief awarded was so 
modest that Britain was ewilling to make the payment called for by the 
court's judgment. 
As the  history of  McCann  demonstrates, enforcement problems are 
unlikely to prove substantial when the court, while finding that a violation 
 
 
 
 
52.    Jd.151. 
53.    Jd.213. 
54.    Rowan Dore, Howard Under Fire After Tory Attacks "Interfering" European Court, 
PRESS ASSOCIATION, Dec. 5, 1996, at Parlimentary News. 
55.    Jd. 
56.    Michael White, Ministers Seek Curb on Rights: Europe-Wide Offensive After 
Embarrassing Rulings, GUARDIAN, Apr. 2, 1996, at 1. 
57.    Id. See also, Lord  Mackay  of  Clashfem,  UK Success at the European Court and 
Commission of Human Right is Not a Rare Event, FIN. TIMES, Dec.  6,  1996,  at  18  (Lord 
Mackay, the Lord Chancellor, describing his effort to promote reform of the ECHR). 
58.    See supra notes 49-57  and accompanying text. 
59.    McCann,222. 
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has occurred, finds either that no just satisfaction is called for or that a small 
payment will suffice. 
Since McCann involved a specific event, rather than an ongoing series 
of events or the application of a policy, rule, or statute of continuing effect, 
a payment of just satisfaction was the only relief that was realistically 
available. In many other situations, at least the consideration of other relief 
is appropriate, since "individual measures" may be needed to undo the 
effects of the violations found by the court. 
 
In addition to the payment of compensation, individual measures 
may be required to ensure that the injured party is put, as far as 
possible, in the same situation as he or she enjoyed prior to the 
violation of the Convention (restitutio in integrum).  For example, 
where the Court has found a violation of Article 8 of the 
Convention caused by the refusal to allow adequate contact 
between a parent and a child in public care, the State will be 
required to facilitate more frequent access visits; in a deportation 
case under Article 3 or 8, the deportation order should be quashed; 
and so on.60 
 
It is in cases of this sort that distinctive elements of the enforcement 
system under the Convention begin to emerge. First, under Article 41, "the 
Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party," but 
such a payment "is the only measure that the European Court can order a 
State responsible for a violation of the Convention to take."61    Second, 
under Article 46, the states who are parties to the Convention have agreed 
"to abide by the final judgment of the court in any case in which they are 
parties."62     Lastly, Article 46 further provides that the Committee of 
Ministers "shall supervise" the execution of ECHR judgments. 63   The court 
itself recently provided a succinct summary of the enforcement process: 
 
The Court recalls that a judgment in which it fmds a breach 
imposes on the respondent state a legal obligation to put an end to 
that breach and make reparation for its consequences in such a 
way as to restore as far as possible the situation existing before the 
breach (restitutio in integrum). However, if restitutio in integrum 
is in practice impossible the respondent states are free to choose 
the means whereby they will comply with a judgment in which the 
Court has found a breach, and the Court will not make 
consequential orders or declaratory statements in this regard. It 
 
 
60.   OVEY & WHITE, supra note 16, at 425. 
61.    LAMBERT-ABDELGAWAD,  supra note 16, at 13. 
62.    European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 2, at article 46. 
63.   !d. 
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falls to the Committee of Ministers acting under Article 54 of the 
Convention to supervise compliance in this respect. ...64 
 
The fact that the principles that govern the enforcement process remain 
entirely unarticulated in the Convention has not prevented the achievement 
of an appropriate outcome in most cases. In Soering v. United Kingdom,65 
for example, the applicant had fled to England after murdering his 
girlfriend's  parents in Virginia, and he  resisted extradition to  Virginia, 
where he faced the  death penalty. 66      The ECHR held that due to  the 
extremely difficult conditions which he would experience during a lengthy 
time on death row if sentenced to death, including the mental anguish 
imposed by the  approach of  an  execution date, implementation of  the 
United Kingdom Secretary of State's decision to extradite Soering would 
violate Article 3 of the Convention.67  Soering requested that the court give 
"directions in relation to the operation" of the court's  judgment, but the 
court declined to do so: 
 
No breach of Article 3 has as yet occurred.   Nevertheless, the 
Court  having  found  that  the  Secretary of  State's  decision  to 
.  extradite to the United States of America would, if implemented, 
give rise to a breach of Article 3, Article 50 [the prior Article 
providing for just satisfaction] must be taken as applying to the 
facts of the present case. 
 
The Court considers that its finding regarding Article 3 of itself 
amounts to adequate just satisfaction for the purposes of Article 
50.  The Court is not empowered under the Convention to make 
accessory directions of the kind requested by the applicant.  By 
virtue of Article 54 [the predecessor of Article 46], the 
responsibility for supervising execution of the Court's judgment 
rests with the Committee of Ministers of the Council ofEurope.68 
 
The court's confidence that its judgment in Soering  would be 
implemented was fully justified. The United Kingdom informed the United 
States that it would not extradite Soering so long as he would face capital 
 
 
64.    Orhan v. Turkey,  App. No. 25656/94,  'If  451 (2002),  available at http://hudoc.echr. 
coe.intlhudocNiewRoot.asp?Item=O&Action=Html&X=328000209&Notice=O&Noticemode= 
&RelatedMode=O (last visited March 22, 2004). 
65.    11 Eur. Ct. H.R. 439 (1989),  available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/hudocNiewRoot. 
asp?Item=O&Action=Htmi&X=326195625&Notice=O&Noticemode=&RelatedMode=O (last 
visited March 22, 2004). 
66.    Id. '1['1[11-15, 76. 
67.    Id. '1['1[76-80.  Article 3, in addition to outlawing torture, prohibits subjecting anyone to 
"inhuman  or degrading  treatment  or punishment."   European  Convention  on Human  Rights, 
supra note 2. 
68.    Id. '1['1[126--27 (citations omitted). 
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charges, and extradition took place only after the United States gave 
assurances that the death penalty would not be sought.69 
Soering  is but one of many cases in  which the enforcement of the 
court's  judgments is not made ineffective simply because it is somewhat 
indirect.  Under the provisions of the Convention quoted above, it is not at 
all surprising that the obligation of a state to comply with judgments of the 
ECHR "has always been interpreted as being purely an obligation to 
produce a specific result," leaving to the state the choice of the means blo 
which that result will be brought about within the domestic legal system. 0 
The rules adopted by the Committee of Ministers to govern their actions 
under Article 46 specifically recognize that in deciding what individual or 
general measures are required, the Committee must take into account "the 
discretion of the state concerned to choose the means necessary to comply 
with the judgment ...."71   Nonetheless, while the initiative rests with the 
state found to have violated the Convention, the Committee reserves for 
itself the ultimate decision on whether "individual measures have been 
taken to ensure that the violation has ceased and that the injured party is put, 
as far as possible, in the same situation as that party enjoyed prior to the 
violation of the Convention."72 
The approach taken by the Committee to bring about compliance with 
respect to the individual claimant depends upon the critical fact that no case 
in which the ECHR fmds a violation of the Convention is over until the 
Committee of Ministers concludes that execution of the judgment has been 
achieved.73    Rule 4a provides as follows: "Until the State concerned has 
provided information on the payment of the just satisfaction awarded by the 
Court or concerning possible individual measures, the case shall be placed 
on the agenda of each human rights meeting of the Committee of Ministers, 
unless the Committee decides otherwise."74   Since the Committee addresses 
human rights enforcement matters in six meetings each year, 75 this schedule 
provides  for  frequent  re-examination of  a  pending  case  to  determine 
whether adequate steps have been taken by the state to comply with the 
 
 
 
69.    Soering was later extradited, convicted, and sentenced  to life in prison.   The United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied his petition for habeas corpus, Soering v. 
Deeds, No. 99-6498,  2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 15443, at *18 (June  8, 2000), cert. denied, 531 
u.s. 1074 (2001). 
70.    LAMBERT-ABDELGAWAD, supra note 16, at 6 (citing Belilios v. Switzerland,  10 Eur. 
Ct. H.R. 466, 492 'lf78 (1988)). 
71.    Committee of Ministers, supra note 17, at Rule 3b. 
72.    Id. 
73.    Jd. at Rule 4. 
74.    Id. atRule4a. 
75.    OVEY&WHITE,supranote 16, at422. 
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principle of restitutio in integrum. The ECHR will not order a state to take 
any particular steps, nor will the Committee, but only when the Committee 
is satisfied that the measures taken are adequate will the Committee enter 
the final resolution in the case.76 
A  comprehensive  survey  of  the  individual  measures  taken  in  cases 
decided by the ECHR provides an instructive list of the types of relief that 
may be adopted by a state to bring about execution of a judgment: 
 
The resumption of the domestic judicial proceedings is 
undoubtedly the most spectacular effect which an international 
judgment can have.  The importance of that measure, and the fact 
that it is the only effective remedy in certain cases, [led] the 
Committee of Ministers to adopt a Recommendation to the States 
on that point. ... 
 
 
Now the majority of European states allow for the re-opening 
of domestic judicial proceedings .... In practice, this measure has 
remained the exception: by December 2000 the domestic 
proceedings had been re-opened in fewer than 15 cases following 
a judgment of the European Court, half of these being criminal 
matters 
 
 
[The] greater supervision by the Committee of Ministers is 
evidence of what for a number of years has been a growing 
consideration for the future of the individual.  The re-opening of 
the proceedings has been regarded by the European Court as a 
measure as close to restitutio in integrum as was possible. 
 
 
Other individual measures may be equally varied.  First of all, 
the  State  concerned  may  decide  not  to  enforce  the  national 
measure at issue, including where it is a judgment, or the measure 
may be annulled .... In criminal matters, a decision to reduce the 
penalty  may  be  taken  at  domestic  level.     Removal  of  the 
conviction  from  the   individual  police  record   is  also  quite 
frequently recognised.77 
 
As to the taking of individual measures, then, the range of possibilities 
is quite broad, and at least in some instances, the Committee of Ministers 
has  made  aggressive  use  of  its  power  not  to  close  out  a  case  until  it 
 
 
76.   See, e.g., Committee of Ministers, supra note 17, at Rule 8. 
77.   LAMBERT-ABDELGAWAD,  supra note 16, at 15-19. 
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considers the provisions made by the state for the applicant to have truly 
placed him or her in the same position as if no violation had occurred. The 
author of the summary quoted above has concluded that "the European 
system sometimes proves to be rather ineffective in terms of the adoption of 
individual non-pecuniary measures, so that the individual is in a sense the 
poor relation of  the system."78      That 'Wpears to  be a  fair assessment, 
although less true today than in the past,   and it certainly is the case that 
the provision of individual relief is handled relatively informally, and is not 
-an area that receives particularly focused attention by the Committee of 
Ministers. It is not that states stubbornly refuse to take individual measures 
considered necessary by the Committee, but rather that the entire question 
of individual measures receives much less attention than just satisfaction 
(where the definite order to pay is easily monitored for compliance) and 
general measures (where the future impact on the state and its citizens is 
much more likely to be significant).80 
The court may be edging toward taking a more assertive posture 
towards the form of individual measures taken by a respondent state.  For 
example, in Brumarescu v. Romania,81 the court's judgment of January 23, 
2001, recognized that parties are "in  principle free to choose the means 
whereby they will comply with a judgment," but went on to declare that 
under the particular circumstances "return of the property in issue ... would 
put the applicant as far as possible in the situation equivalent to the one in 
which he would have been if there had not been a breach ...."82   The court 
directed that "the State should therefore restore [the applicant's] title to the 
rest of the house,"83  though it softened this injunction by specifying the 
amount of pecuniary damage to be paid if the property was not returned.84 
 
 
 
GENERAL MEASURES 
 
The Committee of Ministers does not consider the judgment of the 
ECHR to have been executed, even if the award of just satisfaction has been 
paid and necessary individual measures taken with regard to the applicant, 
 
 
 
78.   Id. at 20. 
79. Id. 
80.   OVEY & WHITE, supra note 16, at 423, 427. 
81.   33 Eur. Ct. H.R. 36 (2001), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.intlhudocNiewRoot. 
asp?Item=1&Action=Html&X=326200216&Notice=O&Noticemode=&RelatedMode=O (last 
visited March 22, 2004). 
82.   Jd. ,,20, 22. 
83.   Id. 122. 
84.   Id. 1120-24. 
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until "general measures have been adopted, preventing new violations 
similar to that or those found or putting an end to continuing violations."85 
A case like McCann86  (the case involving the killings on Gibraltar) 
might not call for any general measures, since there was no reason to 
anticipate a repetition of the incident.   However, the more typical case 
coming before the court involves a statute, rule, or other governmental 
policy that, if left unaltered, would inevitably lead to similar violations in 
the future. Some examples of general measures have been provided above, 
and many more are available for examination. As with individual measures, 
the  ultimate  outcome  reached  involves  the   interplay  of  the  state's 
opportunity and responsibility to take the initiative (with the court and the 
Committee without power to prescribe any particular approach) with the 
state's obligation to satisfy the Committee as to the adequacy of the steps it 
has taken in order to obtain the closing of the matter. The procedure used to 
resolve these sometimes sticky matters is specified in Rule 4 of the 
Committee ofMinisters: 
 
If the state concerned informs the Committee of Ministers that it is 
not yet in a position to inform the Committee that the general 
measures necessary to ensure compliance with the judgment have 
been taken, the case shall be placed again on the agenda of a 
meeting of the Committee of Ministers taking place no more than 
six months later, unless the Committee decides otherwise; the 
same rule shall apply when this period expires and for each 
subsequent period.87 
As the case of Lustig-Prean88   (described above, in which the ECHR 
found a violation in the United Kingdom's exclusion of homosexuals from 
its armed forces) demonstrates, the general measures taken following the 
court's finding of a violation have sometimes been quite dramatic and far- 
reaching in their impact (in that case, prompt revocation of the exclusionary 
policy): Sometimes a step as formal as the amendment of a constitution or 
statute is called for; while at other times, it has been sufficient to alter a 
government's policy, rely upon the national courts to apply the law newly- 
announced by the ECHR, or publicize the court's ruling to relevant officials 
 
 
 
85.   Committee of Ministers, supra note 17, at Rule 3b. 
86.   21 Eur. Ct. H.R. 97 (1996), available  at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/hudocNiewRoot. 
asp?ltem=O&Action=Html&X=326192922&Notice=O&Noticemode=&RelatedMode=O (last 
visited March 22, 2004). 
87.   Committee of Ministers, supra note 17, at Rule 4b. 
88.   29 Eur. Ct. H.R. 548 (2000), available  at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/hudocNiewRoot. 
asp?ltem=1&Action=Html&X=326193203&Notice=O&Noticemode=&RelatedMode=O (last 
visited March 22, 2004). 
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of the state's agencies so that they may be aware of the holding and comply 
with it. 
Perhaps the  most  remarkable result  of  the  enforcement system for 
ECHR judgments is the affected states have almost universally taken the 
necessary steps to satisfy the Committee that future violations are not likely 
to  occur. It should  be  noted  that  an  important  but  somewhat  hazy 
jurisdictional  line  exists. The  Committee  of  Ministers  oversees  the 
enforcement of the judgments of the court and will not close the matter by 
adopting its final resolution until it is satisfied that the state has taken 
adequate steps  to  prevent  repetitions of  the  violation that  occurred.89 
However, once the state adopts general measures and the Committee 
concludes that it has carried out its functions under Article 46, any 
allegations that the new provision or statute or policy of the state is itself 
violative of the Convention or is being applied so as to violate the 
Convention must be brought back before the court in a new case.90    Thus, 
the question of general measures inevitably invites a certain degree of 
prejudgment by the Committee of possible future cases, but the adjudication 
of any such cases lies fully with the court, not the Committee. 
 
 
 
ENFORCEMENT CONTROVERSIES 
 
It would be misleading to conclude this piece, which lauds the generally 
high level of enforcement of ECHR judgments and describes some of the 
mechanisms by which that goal is achieved, without acknowledging that 
there have been controversies-even bitter ones-on occasion.  While their 
occurrence does not, in my view, call for abandoning the views expressed 
above, they do shed some light on the inherent limitations of the 
enforcement system under the Convention. 
The ECHR announced its judgment in Loizidou v. Turke/  1  on July 28, 
1998,  holding  that  the  applicant,  a  Greek  Cypriot,  was  entitled  to 
compensation because she had been denied use of her property after the area 
she lived in was occupied by the Turkish army in 1974.92  Turkey refused to 
pay the award of just satisfaction, leading the Committee of Ministers to 
adopt an interim resolution on July 24, 2000, stating that Turkey's refusal to 
satisfy the judgment "demonstrates a manifest disregard for its international 
 
 
 
3b. 
89.    OVEY & WHITE, supra note 16, at 427; Committee of Ministers, supra note 17, at Rule 
 
90.    Committee of Ministers, supra note 17, at Rule 8. 
91.    Available   at   http:/!hudoc.ecbr.coe.intlhudocNiewRoot.asp?Item=2&Action=Html& 
X=326202947&Notice=O&Noticemode=&RelatedMode=O (last visited March 22, 2004). 
92.    Jd.12-14, 26. 
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obligations."93     On June 26, 2001, the Committee deplored Turkey's 
continuing failure to comply, and declared its "resolve to ensure, with all 
the  means available to the  Organisation, Turkey's  compliance with  its 
obligations under this judgment."94     Even  so,  it  took  another eighteen 
months of further pressure by the Committee before the award was finally 
paid.95    Turkey has been and remains a major enforcement problem, not 
only with regard to the many claims similar to Loizidou's that are being 
presented, but  also  with  regard to  numerous judgments  arising out  of 
Convention violations found by the court to have been committed by the 
Turkish security forces.   The Committee has been unable to secure 
enforcement of the court's judgments in these cases.96 
Another problem area that the Committee has not been able to deal with 
satisfactorily is the inordinate delay experienced by many litigants in Italy, 
which has been found again and again to violate the Convention.97  "Here it 
appears that some small progress is being made, although to a certain extent 
it appears that the problems within the Italian legal system are so deep- 
rooted and pernicious that there is a limit to what the Government can do to 
. . . bring about effective reform."98    While these continuing violations in 
Italy are a serious matter, they present quite a different problem than the 
refusal of a government to pay an award of just satisfaction or to take 
identifiable steps to deal with a discrete problem.   The Committee's 
difficulties in forcing Italy to improve its court system sufficiently to 
comply with the Convention resembles in some ways the thorniest of the 
structural remedy cases in the United States, which have on occasion 
generated years or even decades of litigation over the desegregation of 
school  systems or  the  overhaul of  prisons  or  institutions  housing  the 
disabled in order to provide a constitutionally adequate level of services.99 
 
93.   Interim Resolution DH (2000) 105 Concerning the Judgment of the European Court of 
Human Rights of 28 July 1998 in the Case of Loizidou Against Turkey 'if  7, available at 
http://cm.coe.int/talres/xh/2000/0-299/2000xh105.htm (last visited March 22, 2004). 
94.   Interim Resolution ResDH (2001) 80 Concerning the Judgment of the European Court 
of Human Rights of 28 July 1998 in the Case of Loizidou Against Turkey 'if  8, available at 
http://cm.coe.int/talres/xh/2001/0-299/2001xh80.htm (last visited March 22, 2004). 
95.   Interim Resolution ResDH (2003) 174 Concerning the Judgment of the European 
Court of Human Rights of 28 July 1998 in the Case of Loizidou Against Turkey, available at 
https://wcm.coe.int!ViewDoc.jsp?id=85771&Lang=en (last visited March 22, 2004).   See 
Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily, Turkey Complies with European Court Ruling on Cyprus, But 
Ankara Still "On Hold" on Cyprus, EU, December 5, 2003. 
96.   OVEY & WIDTE, supra note 16, at 429--30. 
97.   !d. at 430. 
98.   !d. 
99.   See e.g., United States v. Bd. ofEduc., 372 F.2d 836, 860 (5th Cir. 1966) (describing 
difficulties implementing desegregation); Finney v. Mabry, 534 F. Supp. 1026 (E.D. Ark. 1982) 
(rejecting initial effort to reform prison system). 
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Of course, not even the most ambitious civil rights litigation in the United 
States has attempted to reform the nation's entire court system.100 
 
 
 
SEPARATION OF POWERS 
 
One additional aspect of the enforcement system under the European 
Convention should be mentioned briefly. Within the United States, through 
the use of remands, the immediate responsibility for enforcing the decisions 
of the courts falls on the courts themselves.  The lower courts are charged 
with interpreting and applying the decisions made by the Supreme Court 
and other appellate courts. Further review by the appellate courts is always 
a possibility if questions arise as to  whether the  implementation of  an 
appellate decision is consistent. 
JudFents of the ECHR are final and not appealable to any other 
court.10       Moreover, there is no judicial role in enforcement of the 
judgments.  The Committee of Ministers, a non-judicial body made up of 
representatives of the governments of the member states of the Council of 
Europe,102 has the authority to determine when a judgment has been fully 
executed.103   While the ECHR's decision and reasoning obviously inform 
the Committee's deliberations, the process is inevitably more political than 
it would be if carried out by independent judicial officers. 
The enforcement process before the Committee can be very political, 
especially if the violating state simply refuses to comply.  Expulsion from 
the Council of Europe is possible under such circumstances, but it has been 
observed that "the harsh nature of that measure has rendered it wholly 
inappropriate and thus far it has not been put into practice."104 However, 
concern about possible expulsion presumably motivated Greece to 
withdraw from the Council of Europe for four years in the early 1970s, 
when widespread human rights violations committed by the military 
government were challenged.105     Likewise, while Turkey may not fear 
immediate expulsion from the Council of Europe for its delays in paying 
 
 
100.  Kalashnikov v. Russia, 36 Eur. Ct. H.R. 34 (2002), may well mark the beginning of 
another major crisis over enforcement. The Court found that a criminal defendant's conditions 
of confinement violated Article 3, id. 103, yet there may well be thousands of other Russian 
prisoners held under similar or even worse conditions. 
101.  European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 2, at article 46, 1. 
102.  !d. at article 38. 
103.  OVEY & WHITE, supra note 16, at 421-23; Committee of Ministers, supra note 17, at 
Rule 8. 
104.  LAMBERT-ABDELGAWAD, supra note 16, at 38. 
105.  See e.g., Nsongurua J. Udombana, Can the Leopard Change Its Spots? The African 
Union Treaty and Human Rights, 17 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 1177, 1205-06 (2002). 
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judgments like that in Loizidou or even for the abuses being committed by 
its security forces, it does aspire to membership in the European Union. 106 
Turkey  has  encountered  substantial  difficulty  in  pursuing  its  European 
Union candidacy,107 and would no doubt be correct in concluding that a 
substantially improved human rights record (measured at least in part by 
enforcement  of  the  ECHR  judgments  against  it)  is  a  necessary  if  not 
sufficient condition for admission to the European Union. 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights are enforced by a 
process  that  is  quite  unlike  the  enforcement  processes  common  in  the 
United States.   Most notably, there is no prospect of remand from the 
European Court, and the court plays no role in enforcing its judgments.  The 
court can award "just satisfaction" to a successful claimant in the form of a 
monetary payment but is without power to enter any injunction or specify 
any other action to be taken by the offending state. 
Despite these dramatic differences between the European and American 
processes for assuring compliance, the two systems seem to achieve similar 
results.  Though somewhat indirect from the American point of view, the 
ECHR/Committee of Ministers process has achieved a high level of 
compliance  by the  states.   Despite  the  occasional  problems  encountered 
under the Convention, the successful enforcement of ECHR judgments 
strongly suggests that enforcement of judicial decisions in no way depends 
on remands.         · 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
106.  See e.g., Craig S. Smith, Turks Say to Europe: Can't We Just Come as We Are?, N.Y. 
TIMEs, Nov. 23,2002, at A-3. 
107.  Id. 
